The Paradox of Public Participation in Fisheries Governance. the Rising Number of Actors and the Devolution Process by Suárez de Vivero, Juan Luis et al.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
41
43
45
47
49
51
53
55
57
5þmodel JMPO : 713
Prod:Type:FTP
pp:127ðcol:fig::NILÞ
ED:Dibyendu
PAGN:Bhaskara SCAN:0308-597X/$ - s
doi:10.1016/j.m
Correspond
E-mail addr
1A superﬁcia
Marine Policy
social scientists
Please cite thi
devolution....Marine Policy ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]]
www.elsevier.com/locate/marpolThe paradox of public participation in ﬁsheries governance. The rising
number of actors and the devolution process
Juan L. Sua´rez de Viveroa,, Juan C. Rodrı´guez Mateosa, D. Florido del Corralb
aDepartment of Human Geography, University of Seville, Marı´a de Padilla, s/n, 41004 Seville, Spain
bDepartment of Social Anthropology, University of Seville, Marı´a de Padilla, s/n, 41004 Seville, Spain
Received 26 March 2007; received in revised form 25 June 2007; accepted 25 June 2007 PR
OO
FAbstract
During the process by which the number of actors was increased manifold as a result of the development of civil society, the ﬁsher
community has lost prominence and importance, fading into the wide spectrum of interests with which it is competing to make its voice
heard in decision-making bodies and in the media. This results in what could be termed the participation paradox—the greater the
number of actors, the smaller the role each plays, and the lesser the importance of traditional sectors. Participation and devolution do not
bear a linear relationship; greater devolution does not necessarily result in greater participation, a claim that has contributed to the
processes of devolution being overvalued. Governance, as interaction between State, civil society and the market, paradoxically might
not strengthen the most traditional of the interest groups.
r 2007 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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T1. Introduction
Recent developments (from around the beginning of the
1990s onwards) in studies on ﬁsheries management have
revolved around the ideas of decentralization, devolution,
regionalization and participation.1 The crisis in the ﬁshing
industry in developed economies and in European Union
member countries in particular, has led to the management
systems themselves being questioned [1] as being incapable
of bringing a halt to the decrease in resources. This has, in
turn, resulted in the decline both of areas dependent on
ﬁshing and of ﬁsher communities that are ever more
reticent about the CFP. In short, twin crises that have both
biological and institutional aspects.
A series of research studies conducted as part of the
various EU Framework Programmes have in recent years
explored possible alternatives to the management systems75
77
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l examination of the literature on this matter published in
during the period 1989–2006 shows that the interest of
has been focused on these topics.
s article as: Sua´rez de Vivero JL, et al. The paradox of public p
Marine Policy (2007), doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2007.06.005that predominate in European institutions [2,3] with a
single common denominator—to strengthen the participa-
tion of the whole gamut of social actors in order that
reforms, characterized by the hefty reduction in the ﬁshing
effort, might be taken on board and the EU ﬁshing policy
thus given greater legitimacy and credibility. One working
hypothesis that has been accepted is excessive centralism
on the part of the Commission, the disadvantage of which
is the distancing of those it is administrating. Conse-
quently, the need to begin a process of devolution that
might allow the traditional actors in the ﬁshing industry to
regain a lead role is being looked at.2 A plethora of
concepts relating to devolution and participation have been
considered with the aim of establishing new regulatory
frameworks for ﬁsheries management and the relationship
between the industry and the institutions.
This paper assumes the following premises: (i) During
the process by which the number of actors was increased
manifold as a result of the development of civil society, the
ﬁsher, the ﬁsher community, has lost prominence and79
81
2For the Commission’s determination and political will in carrying
through this devolution process, see [4].
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4Spain is peculiar in the sense that it has undergone a radical reform in
the way the State is politically and territorially organized (the 1978
Constitution), going from being a centralized structure to a highly
decentralized one (Autonomous Communities) almost akin to a federal
State.
5The possibility of moving from centralized management to co-
management is shown in [7].
6The European Sharing Responsibilities in Fisheries Management [8]
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importance, fading into the wide spectrum of interests with
which it is competing to make its voice heard in decision-
making bodies and in the media. This results in what could
be termed the participation paradox—the greater the
number of actors, the smaller the role each plays, and the
lesser the importance of traditional sectors. (ii) Participa-
tion and devolution, in a variety of expressions, such as
regionalization and decentralization, do not bear a linear
relationship; greater devolution does not necessarily result
in greater participation, a claim that has contributed to the
processes of devolution being overvalued. (iii) The notions
of devolution, participation and co-management, which at
the turn of the century have been milestones in the process
of perfecting ﬁsheries management, what is now also a
more complex process, however, have been included in the
governance paradigm. Governance, as interaction between
State, civil society and the market, paradoxically might not
strengthen the most traditional of the interest groups.
The analysis herein is structured into three main ideas: (i)
decentralization and participation, (ii) co-management,
and (iii) governance and governability, in which it is
possible to include the main contributions made by social
sciences to ﬁsheries management in recent years.
2. Devolution: interpretive scheme
The way democracy has developed and the deeper roots
that it has put down over recent decades are closely linked
with the process of building what is known as civil society.
Representative democracy concentrated decision-making
in large institutions limiting citizen participation to the
election of representatives in State bodies. Professional and
guild organizations which in activities like ﬁshing had
played a highly relevant role in management until well into
the 20th century [5] lost the inﬂuence they used to bear to
State institutions (including scientiﬁc institutions) to the
point that in some European countries, the latter have
reached the stage where they monopolize the function of
ﬁsheries management [6]. Nevertheless, over the last 20
years there has been an evident trend towards a demand for
the participation of individuals, interest groups and
associations in public affairs through the debate about
participatory democracy or direct democracy. The latest
currents in social sciences highlight the importance of
participation in social movements and in voluntary action
networks as one of the elements that develops the capacity
of individuals to assume self-government.3
This new track towards management models with
greater participation has led not only to a resurgence of
traditional organizations in Europe (in Spain, the Fisher-
men’s Guilds), but also the creation of new ones, such as
producer organizations, although with patchy results.
Given this set of circumstances, proposals aimed at
reducing the role played by the State in favor of either3Self-government means the freedom to govern through the absence of
control.
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the various actors in civil society or of the market, have
been transferred to the sphere of the ﬁshing industry in
such a way that a range of concepts such as regionalization,
decentralization, delegation, subsidiarity, co-management,
sharing responsibilities, self-management, empowerment and
deconcentration, have been used in the design of alternative
management models.
All these concepts can be included in an interpretive
scheme which relates the degree of participation to the
degree of centralization–decentralization. In the case of
Spain4 (Fig. 1), this allows the different expressions to be
seen as the process develops whilst also offering an
overview of their relative positions on the Participation–-
Decentralization axis and on the path that runs between
the centralized State model (pre-1978) and a theoretical
State which combines the highest level of participation with
the greatest degree of decentralization. These expressions
of the devolution process relate to the general management
of ﬁsheries activity (in which the various tiers of admin-
istration are involved) as well as to sub-sector forms of
ﬁshing that in an experimental or circumstantial way have
included initiatives with a greater involvement on the part
of ﬁshers and other agents in the ﬁsheries chain.
It is evident by the way in which ﬁsheries management
has evolved in the various European countries that
progress from greater decentralization to greater self-
government is not necessarily made in a straight line, and
the example of the European Union, where the CFP
involves the loss or transfer of State sovereignty to EU
institutions, corroborates this. In a similar fashion, the
different options for particular types of devolution do not
require a progressive, step-by-step course towards greater
decentralization or regionalization.5 In other regards, as
can be seen from the cases of Spain, France, Norway,
Denmark and the United Kingdom,6 it is possible for a
high level of political and administrative decentralization
to coexist with a limited degree of participation on the part
of social agents and, in sensu contrario, likewise centralized
State models with a highly developed culture of participa-
tion. Participation as an expression of politically advanced
societies can, to an extent, be understood as an indepen-
dent variable of the State organizational model but always,
naturally, in the context of the modern democratic State
with direct representation (Fig. 2).113
project proposes and assesses alternative ﬁsheries management models
with a greater degree of decentralization with regard to EU and State
administrations, and greater participation by the various stakeholders.
articipation in ﬁsheries governance. The rising number of actors and the
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Fig. 1. Ratio between participation and decentralization. The situation in Spain.
Fig. 2. Ratio between participation and decentralization in some European countries.
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Co-management is without doubt a key concept in the
recent development of theory and praxis in ﬁsheries
management. Firstly, because other concepts that are
relevant to the scientiﬁc discussion on ﬁsheries manage-Please cite this article as: Sua´rez de Vivero JL, et al. The paradox of public p
devolution.... Marine Policy (2007), doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2007.06.005ment concur in co-management, and distinguish it from
other more technical and limited terms, such as participa-
tory/collaborative/cooperative management and community
based management [9]. And, secondly, because the way the
concept itself has evolved from the 1980s to the present day
is an indication of the direction of the prevalent points ofarticipation in ﬁsheries governance. The rising number of actors and the
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view in scientiﬁc discourse regarding ﬁsheries manage-
ment—an advance towards participation by new social
agents and the progressive decentralization of the decision-
making processes [10]. There are three key elements to this
concept, which was developed by specialist literature
during the 1990s: (i) the need for decentralization given
the failure of the centralist system dominated by the State
as a political agent which went before, (ii) the importance
of social agents’ participation in the political process, and
(iii) the recognition of folk management systems [11]. These
three features should better guarantee the ﬁshers’ con-
ﬁdence in the political system, which, according to co-
management paradigm theorists, would then result in
measures being better applied.
It is a fact that the intense use of the term has led to
greater ambiguity, whereby it has become a label for a
broad gamut of proposals, both as regards objectives and
the social agents and institutions involved in the process.
Because of this, several papers have made great efforts to
deﬁne the term theoretically [12] and to classify different
types of co-management [13,14]. If we take as our base
reference the deﬁnition offered by Jentoft in 1989 [15,16],
co-management is understood as some kind of partnership
between the administration and the associations that
represent the ﬁshers for sharing responsibility for manage-
ment tasks, and it is speciﬁcally this that distinguishes it
from consultative arrangements. The need to augment the
political effectiveness and legitimacy of traditional top–-
down management systems, especially through an increase
in the compliance of the ﬁshers, was the prime argument of
the proposal, and this is how it has persistently been seized
upon in subsequent tradition.
But innovative elements are nonetheless important in
scientiﬁc discourse. The most important of these has been
the opening up of the co-decision political process to new
social and institutional subjects, to the point that the idea
of partnership between ﬁshers and the administration has
been quite clearly surpassed. As such, in the second half of
the 1990s [13,17], co-management was understood as the
result not just of collaboration between users groups (withUN
CO
R
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these no longer being explicitly limited to the ﬁshers) and
the government, but also agencies and research institutions.
From this moment on, the concept broadens, especially
with regard to who ought to form part of the system. This
option is clearly deﬁned in Mikalsen and Jentoft [18]—
ﬁsheries management should involve new social agents
through more inclusive and participatory methodology
that transcends sectoral limits. It should take as its basis
the stakeholder approach; that is, it should take into
consideration all the social and institutional agents that
have a legitimate right to be consulted in ﬁsheries policy
decisions in recognition of the fact that ﬁsh stocks and
maritime territory are a common property resource; to wit:
local communities, environmental organizations and agen-
cies, researchers, consumers, the media, representatives of
the ﬁsheries chain and other maritime industries, and
future generations. The focus also establishes that the
system of relationships between these subjects should
remain under State control, with the State being primarily
understood to be an arbiter in a complex assemblage rather
than one of the cornerstones of the system occupying a
hierarchical position.
Having come thus far, it seems evident that the concept
of co-management should be associated with: (a) the
strengthening of the local perspective, in the sense that the
community should be restored as a key domain in
management [19,20]; (b) the delegation of power from
governmental agencies to social and institutional agencies
linked to the ﬁsheries chain and local communities; that is,
it should be associated with the empowerment of these very
agents [21]; (c) more inclusive and transparent institutions,
more democratic instruments; and (d) a political system
which steers clear of the cognitive exclusiveness of science
and incorporates forms of ‘‘folk’’ knowledge; and all the
aspects that this entails [22,23].
All the potentialities of co-management having been set
out, it is now necessary to point out the difﬁculties that
exist for it to be implemented: (a) the need to work on a
variety of political and territorial scales; (b) adaptation to
the wide variety of social agents’ needs; (c) the reluctance of99
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becoming sensitized to local/regional conditions (given its
centralizing vocation); (d) the status quo of the power
relationships in the ﬁsheries chain at the current time, with
historical control by the marketing and industrialization
agents growing due to the processes of globalization; (e) the
representativeness of the ﬁsheries organizations and their
lack of political coordination; (f) the lack of prior
experiences after a long period of time with a centralized
management model; and (g) the very ambiguity of the
concept, under which a wide range of experiences are
presented. Bearing in mind all these difﬁculties, it might be
conjectured that the failures of premature and insufﬁciently
robust co-management experiences put the potential
existence of the focus at risk. Be that as it may, the
theoretical development of the concept towards a perma-
nent opening up to social agents as participants in the
decision-making process allows us to accept what we have
referred to as the participation paradox. The truth of the
matter is ﬁshers have progressively lost their decision-
making capacity and political presence as they have had to
compete with the viewpoints, objectives and strategies of
other actors who have recently been invited to take a
political part. (Fig. 3).E
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4. Governance and governability
Governance and governability represent a third impor-
tant milestone in this discourse on the role of social
participation in ﬁsheries management as they bring
together in one way or another these devolution and co-
management concepts and approaches. In simple terms, the
governance/governability paradigm equates to a large
‘‘melting-pot-concept’’ into which are poured all the
preceding approaches to ﬁsheries management and the
principles that inspire them: participation, decentralization
and ﬂexibility.
Governance is on occasion interpreted as an action
executed by the government (when this is understood to be
a grouping of formal executive power institutions),
although it is much more than this.7 Kooiman [25] deﬁned
it as the free play of participation and trade-off between the
various social actors, and between the public and private
sectors, without traditional government intervention, ‘‘co-
ordination without a coordinator’’ or a type of ‘‘governing
without Government’’ [26,27]. Governance could therefore
be deﬁned as a kind of social coordination (as opposed to
coordination based on the market or based on politics) that
is born out of the constant interaction between social
agents of all types. The concept is associated with the
capacity for self-coordination that networks made up of a7For example, one of the things that Stoker [24] puts forward is the idea
that governance could develop not only from formal institutions, but also
from others. He also asserts that there is an interdependence between the
various actors in this model and that self-organized networks of social
actors progressively gain importance.
Please cite this article as: Sua´rez de Vivero JL, et al. The paradox of public p
devolution.... Marine Policy (2007), doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2007.06.005D P
RO
OF
wide variety of public and private, State and transnational
organizations and bodies possess [28].
From the 1990s onwards, and especially after 2000, the
concept of governance burst onto the ocean and ﬁsheries
management scene,8 in an attempt to provide an explana-
tion to a dynamic, complex, ever-changing, often cross-
border reality in which social and institutional groups
(State, market, civil society) with generally diverse interests
interact. The concept of governance seems to be more
related to the need to manage a complex socio-economic
and physical reality and to the achievement of certain goals
that characterize the post-modern era [32].
Development grown out of traditional systems of ﬁsh-
eries management, in which the State was key, and where
some social actors (ﬁshers, basically) were sometimes taken
into consideration, has more recently turned into more
ﬂexible management, with a more prominent role played
by the market and its resource assignation mechanisms.
Ocean and ﬁsheries governance is, after all, founded on an
already very robust epistemological product and on a series
of key principles (sustainability, participation, transpar-
ency, accountability, ﬂexibility and precaution, to name
but some9) that have afforded it a measure of prestige in
the scientiﬁc community and that provide adequate guide-
lines for analysis (the descriptive aspect) and intervention
(the prescriptive aspect). Of all the different types of
governance—hierarchical governance (based on adminis-
trative rationality), market governance (based on economic
rationality) and participatory governance (founded on
social consensus and ‘‘democratic pragmatism’’)—it is the
third and last of these that would seem to be prevailing
today, with its post-materialistic foundations, the value of
responses based on collective knowledge and action, the
need for decentralization and the loss of steam of the other
two models [37].
Governability is a different concept, but one which
complements governance. It refers to issues such as order,
stability, efﬁciency and the legitimacy of a management
system; that is, the effectiveness with which the range of
socio-political actors arrive at decisions and the capacity of
institutions and government to apply and implement them.
In short, governability would be a capacity or an attribute
for governing (associated with some public power or a
political system), whereas governance refers above all to
the structures (game rules) and processes which condition
the participation and interaction of the various socio-
political actors [38]. Governability comprises both the
political system of management (governance) and the111
113
books written during the 1970s and 1980s bear names that preferentially
include the concepts of marine policy or ocean management, whereas from
the 1990s onwards the concept of ocean governance predominates in titles
[29–31].
9These principles can be looked up in a number of documents and
articles [33–36].
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socio-economic reality that is to be managed, as well as
interaction between both.
At the current time, ﬁshing is both affected and
structured by three institutional orders (State, community,
market), and there has been a notable retreat of State
institutions and the lack of adaptation of their structures to
the reality of the market and ecology whilst at the same
time there has also been an increase in the number of
market solutions (a quest for efﬁciency, ITQs and so on)
[6]. Given these circumstances, the big issue is the distorted
interpretation of ﬁsheries governance resulting from the
fact that traditional public ﬁsheries management has been
replaced by either more diffuse processes or others that are
more strongly linked to the market, to large transnational
companies and strong economic lobbies, with the more
social aspects being somewhat sidelined. In short, ﬁsheries
management is now more ﬂexible and ‘‘free’’, but the
guarantees for safeguarding socio-economic and environ-
mental rights have been excessively minimized, with
accountability being more and more diffusely spread, and
producer participation diluted in a wide and complex
spectrum of social actors. There are, naturally, some
speciﬁc structures and game rules (ﬁsheries governance10).
Nevertheless, greater effectiveness, capacity and legitimacy
in the implementation of the decisions that affect both the
sector and, especially, those whose livelihoods depend on it
(ﬁsheries governability), still remain to be achieved. The
question is whether the latter of the two will be achieved or
not on the basis of the ‘‘mercantilist’’ governance that is
prevailing [40] and through a diffuse system of responsi-
bilities in which the weakest social actors perceive
participation more as rhetoric than a tangible reality.
5. Concluding remarks
The emergence of management formulae that seek
greater social participation as part of the devolution
process is resulting in a widening of the spectrum of social
actors. One indicator that illustrates this is the emergence
of the gender perspective, which has allowed a social group
not traditionally taken into consideration in ﬁsheries
management to gain prominence. For this reason, it would
be necessary to redeﬁne the game rules not only because of
the effect that the increase in the number of participants is
having, but also because of the complexity that is inherent
in the existence of a network of interactions between
traditional and emerging actors who do not always share
common interests.
Co-management can be understood to be a focus rather
than a number of strictly technical solutions [41] that ﬁts in
with the new interactive governance approaches that are
required to cater for the complex biological, socio-
economic, territorial, political and cultural relationships
that in one way or another both shape and are shaped by10An analysis of ﬁsheries governance and political institutions can be
found in [39].
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the fisheries chain when this is seen in a complex way [42]. It
is, therefore, a perspective that is in keeping with the new
concept of sustainability as it appears in the Code of
Conduct for Responsible Fishing (FAO, 1995) and which
subsequently has been expressed in ethical terms in the
ﬁsheries domain [43].
The paradigm of governance could in metaphorical
terms be interpreted as a kind of matryoshka or ‘‘nested
doll principle’’11; that is, a focus that, perhaps not always
intentionally, both assumes and subsumes preceding
management formulae in an attempt to construct a broader
concept capable of taking on board the ever more complex
participatory process. It could be said that the devolution
approach and subsequent approaches relating to co-
management and, most recently, to governance/govern-
ability, serve to swell the ranks of management prescrip-
tions, which have been progressively growing, and which,
despite advocating self-regulation, shared management,
social dialogue and the preservation of the environment,
run the risk of being discourse rather than real political
interventional praxis for the ﬁsheries crisis [41].ED
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